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CITIZEN AS LAWYER, LAWYER AS CITIZEN
MARK TUSHNET*
I. ORDINARY PEOPLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Ordinary people engage in constitutional analysis.1 How do they
do so? How should they do so? What can lawyers contribute to their
engagement? In this brief Essay I offer some anecdote-based spec-
ulations on the first question, which lead to some reflections on the
second and third.2
Most lawyers have some experience with popular constitutional
interpretation. Most of us have read something about extreme con-
stitutional interpretations, of the sort associated with tax protesters
who believe that the income tax is unconstitutional.3 But, popular
constitutional interpretation is more widespread and, by a large
margin, much more sensible. Ordinary people think about the
Constitution when they discuss antigay protests at military
funerals, considering whether such protests are forms of political
expression protected by the First Amendment or are instead forms
of hate speech that governments can permissibly regulate.4 They
think about the Constitution when they discuss abortion rights,
* William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. Throughout this Essay I refer to "ordinary people," although sometimes I shift to the
term "citizens" despite its implications--not always misplaced-for the identity of the class
of people that is my primary concern.
2. I am not aware of substantial studies on popular constitutional interpretation,
although I suspect that scholars of communications and political science have produced some.
I put aside in this discussion constitutional interpretation by executive officials and
legislators, which raises issues different from the ones I am interested in exploring here.
3. See, e.g., Crain v. Comm'r, 737 F.2d 1417, 1418 (5th Cir. 1984) (dismissing an
argument that the U.S. income tax is unconstitutional as without "colorable merit").
4. See, e.g., NBC Today Show (NBC television broadcast Nov. 1, 2007), transcript
available at 2007 WL 21546556 (documenting an interview with Albert Snyder, who
successfully won a lawsuit against groups who protested his son's military funeral, in which
Mr. Snyder stated, "Well, my son fought [in Iraq) for freedom of speech. My son did not fight
for freedom of hate speech. And that's basically what it is.").
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with prochoice people defending their positions by referring to a
woman's liberty and equality interests, and prolife people arguing
that fetuses (or unborn children, as they see it) are "persons" within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore entitled
to the state's protection.5
My own experience with popular constitutional interpretation
comes from two areas. I recently published a book on the Second
Amendment, which is perhaps the constitutional provision about
which the largest number of nonlawyers have reasonably firm inter-
pretive positions.6 In writing the book and in discussions with ordi-
nary people-that is, nonlawyers-about the Second Amendment
after the book was published, I found that firmly held positions split
sharply on what the Second Amendment means, but were basically
united in interpretive approach: ordinary people are straight-
forward textualists.7 Gun-rights proponents observe that the
Amendment's second clause, sometimes in lawyers' discourse called
the "operative" clause, uses the phrase "right to keep and bear
arms," and assert that the phrase must refer to the same kind of
right that other Bill of Rights provisions create.' Gun-control
proponents, in contrast, focus on the Amendment's first clause, its
"preamble," which refers to "a well-regulated militia," and assert
that whatever right the Amendment creates has to have something
to do with membership in a militia, an organized and collective
body, and that the right is not a purely individual right like the
others in the Bill of Rights.9
A second example of popular textualism comes from my study of
African American civil rights lawyers in the first half of the
twentieth century. When one reads biographies of those lawyers, or
their autobiographies, one finds a striking number of occasions in
5. See, e.g., Catherine Verna, Letter to the Editor, Technology Proves Fetus in Womb
Alive, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, July 10, 2008, at A8 (arguing that "[a]n unborn baby has the
same right to life and protection of the 14th Amendment ... as [we all] have").
6. MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONsTITUTION CAN'T END THE BATTLE
OVER GUNS (2007) [hereinafter TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE]. For my earlier observation about
the prevalence of popular constitutionalism with respect to the Second Amendment, see MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 124 (1999).
7. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE, supra note 6, at 2.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. Of course, the Supreme Court rejected this view in District of Columbia v. Heller,
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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which textualism is said to have propelled the subject toward
becoming a civil rights lawyer.1" The structure of the events is
similar: the young person obtains a copy of the Constitution-
sometimes from a favorite relative, sometimes while sitting in a
school room-and reads it. On reaching the Fourteenth Amendment,
the subject reads the phrase "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person
... the equal protection of the laws,"1 and is struck by the fact that
"equal protection of the laws" would be an extremely desirable state
of affairs, but is at odds with the subject's experience in a segre-
gated society.12 Reading the Constitution's text leads the subject to
become a lawyer who will eventually take it as his or her duty to
make reality reflect the text.1
3
Textualism is the nonlawyer's first interpretive principle, but it
is not the only one. Nonlawyers are also purposivists in interpreta-
tion. They supplement their textualism with explanations to the
effect that the text read as they would read it makes good policy
sense. 4 So, for example, limiting the Second Amendment right to
persons and weapons with some connection to a state-organized
militia makes sense because it allows the people acting through
their representatives to respond to outbreaks of gun-based vio-
lence.' 5 Or, on the other side, the individual-rights interpretation
makes sense because it allows people to defend themselves against
criminal predators when the government has not been able to
provide an adequate collective defense. 6 It also serves as an
essential check on the possibility that the government will become
tyrannical, not so much because an armed people will be able to
resist a modern army (although such a people operating as a guer-
illa force can make a soldier's life miserable), but more because a
people confident in its ability to defend itself against an oppressive
10. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT
THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 37-38 (1992).
11. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. See, e.g., DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 10, at 37-38.
13. See, e.g., id.
14. For an overview of this interpretive theory, see TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE, supra note
6, at 71-72.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id.
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government will be alert to incursions on their rights and will not
elect representatives who might become tyrants.17
In addition, nonlawyers are weak traditionalists. In popular
culture the fact that a practice has been regulated extensively for a
long time counts against a claim that people have a constitutional
right to engage in the practice, and the fact that a practice has
gone on without regulation for a long time counts in favor of a claim
that people have a constitutional right to engage the practice. The
traditionalist interpretive principle is weak, though. Traditions are
only occasionally robust enough to support any conclusions. More
important, as against a tradition of regulation, people can say that
we have only recently become alert to the ways in which regulation
impinges on our rights, and, as against a tradition of non-regula-
tion, people can say that the practice has only recently become
widespread enough to justify regulatory intervention.
Nonlawyers almost never rely on precedents to explain their
preferred interpretations. That is hardly surprising, of course,
because nonlawyers are rarely familiar with the precedents,
particularly when the precedents are thick on the ground. The
exceptions are cases like Brown v. Board of Education"8 and Roe v.
Wade, 9 which enter into popular understanding not so much as
precedents in the lawyer's sense of the term, but rather as refer-
ences that capture some deeper principle to which people are
committed or opposed.2"
Finally, ordinary people are not really originalists in constitu-
tional interpretation. Sometimes people will refer to something
like original understandings, but such references are almost always
ways of referring to text or tradition. Originalism comes into
popular discussions largely because originalism has been widely
disseminated as the preferred interpretive method, and people think
that they should somehow be originalists even if they are not quite
sure what originalism really is, or, perhaps more important, even
17. Id.
18. 347 U.S. 686 (1954).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. I suspect that this phenomenon is what politicians and scholars are attempting to
capture when they refer to some decisions as "superprecedents." That is, that term may refer
to cases as symbols of deeper commitments rather than as generators of legal meaning. See
generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006).
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if they lack a good handle on what a constitutional provision's
adopters understood the provision to mean.21
In some sense, of course, no one should be surprised that text-
ualism and purposivism are the people's interpretive methods. Text
and purpose are the only things to which ordinary people have
ready-and unmediated-access. Everything else-legal doctrine
and precedents most obviously, but even original understand-
ings-are the province of legal specialists. At the same time, though,
lawyers know that textualism, purposivism, and weak tradition-
alism cannot adequately support constitutional interpretation.
And indeed, if ordinary people were able to reflect on the role of
textualism and purposivism in the Second Amendment context, they
would come to the same understanding: the text speaks in one way
to gun-rights proponents, in another to gun-control proponents.22
The inadequacy2" of the interpretive theories ordinary people use
when they think about the Constitution means that lawyers can
make a valuable contribution to popular constitutionalism. I con-
fine my attention to a specific but important phenomenon: popular
understanding of particular constitutional rights in ordinary
political discussions.24 Questions of public policy often implicate
21. For good accounts of originalism's dissemination, see JOHNATHAN O'NEILL,
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005) (sympa-
thetic to originalism), and Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The
Right's Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545-48 (2006) (unsympathetic to
originalism).
22. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE, supra note 6, argues that participants in popular
discussions of the Second Amendment are actually unlikely to achieve this reflective state
because each participant's position derives from a cultural predisposition prior to the
participant's views on the Second Amendment's meaning. Id. at 127-36.
23. I write "inadequacy" to indicate that textualism, purposivism, and traditionalism have
some place in both a well-informed popular constitutionalism and professional consti-
tutionalism.
24. Bruce Ackerman argues that ordinary people do not-and properly do not-pay much
attention to constitutional issues in what he calls times of ordinary politics; instead, they
leave policymaking to the processes of interest group bargaining. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 245-48 (1991). Perhaps so, if we are considering the large-scale
structure of our constitutional order. But Ackerman's account is clearly wrong with respect
to some important questions, such as gun rights and abortion. Similarly, LARRY D. KRAMER,
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004), focuses
primarily on how ordinary people historically contributed to large-scale constitutional
transformations, but have ceased to do so today. Lawyers may well play or have played a
different role in such large-scale processes than they do in ordinary times, and I do not
speculate here on those roles.
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constitutional questions as well, and sometimes popular discus-
sions of the policy issues include some explicit attention to the
constitutional questions. What can lawyers contribute to such
discussions?
Perhaps relatively little. Consider here an argument derived
from one made by James Madison.25 Addressing the concern that
legislators motivated by desire for re-election and for their private
interests would not adopt laws that advanced the public interest,
Madison offered an ingenious argument. True, he conceded, indi-
vidual legislators might be badly motivated.26 But, he continued,
laws result from the aggregation of individual votes. What
happens when we aggregate the (badly motivated) votes of individ-
ual legislators from a republic with a large territory and wildly
diverse local interests? Madison suggested two outcomes. One was
that no legislation would result, which was from his point of view
not an obviously bad thing.28 The other, more interesting in the
present context, is that the bad motivations would cancel each other
out.29 The legislation that resulted would rest solely on the core of
public interest embedded within each legislator's selfish position.3"
Perhaps something similar might occur in popular discussions
of policies that implicate constitutional rights. Each participant
puts forward a position that combines a view about good public
policy and a view about the Constitution's meaning. The discussions
themselves might involve sharply divergent positions on both parts,
particularly because of the previously noted convergence between
views about good public policy and views about the Constitution's
meaning. So, for example, letters to newspaper editors might be
completely polarized on both dimensions: policy and constitutional
meaning. Yet, when we move from abstract discussions to poli-
cymaking, the polarization might disappear. Perhaps the compro-
mises ordinarily required to enact public policies will rest on
accepting to some degree the constitutional views offered by both
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sides. And the constitutional position implicit in the policy as
adopted might be "correct" from a lawyer's point of view.3'
According to this argument, lawyers need do nothing to influence
the course of public discussion, because professionally acceptable
interpretations will result from the operation of ordinary politics.
Yet, this adaptation of Madison's argument has an obvious defect.
Both versions of the argument rely on the aggregation of partisan
views to produce, in one, policy that advances the public interest,
and in the other, good constitutional interpretations. Why, though,
should we think that the aggregation of partisan views will actually
occur? The argument Madison made also included another proposi-
tion: representatives have an incentive to get something done, so
that they can go to their constituents and run on their records.32
Gridlock, that is, is not an attractive outcome for representatives.
So, when their purely private and partisan interests are cancelled
by others' opposing private and partisan interests, representatives
nonetheless want to get something done, and all that is left is the
public interest. As far as I can tell, ordinary people have no similar
incentives to get something done, and so there is no reason to think
that anything like an aggregation of conflicting views among the
public will actually occur.
This implies that lawyers might actually have something to
contribute to public discussions. And the contribution is obvious:
information to which ordinary people do not have ready access.
Earlier I referred to this as "precedent,"33 but here the term has to
take on a distinctive meaning. Of course we can inform people about
what the Supreme Court has done on a disputed question of con-
stitutional interpretation or on questions related to those under
public discussion. I am unsure, however, if providing that sort of
information is useful. If ordinary people accept judicial suprem-
acy-that is, if they believe with Charles Evans Hughes that "the
31. This possibility is supported by the proposition, which I have defended elsewhere, that
constitutional interpretation in the United States is eclectic, drawing in almost every case on
a range of interpretive approaches. Mark Tushnet, The United States: Eclecticism in the
Service of Pragmatism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 7 (Jeffrey
Goldsworthy ed., 2006).
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
33. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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Constitution is what the judges say it is"34-- the information might
be useful, even dispositive. Rarely, though, will the Court's decisions
be so clear that telling people, even those who accept judicial
supremacy, what the Court has said will be more than a modestly
relevant datum.35
And, after all, not all ordinary people are judicial supremacists,
at least with respect to the constitutional questions they most care
about. Indeed, my sense-again, based on anecdote rather than
systematic evidence-is that many ordinary people (I would guess
most, in fact) reject judicial supremacy in favor of an alternative.
One alternative is departmentalist: here people agree that the
courts have the final word on matters that come before them, but
that until the courts resolve particular questions everyone has the
right to develop his or her own constitutional interpretation. The
other somewhat stronger alternative is that everyone has the right
and perhaps the duty to develop his or her own constitutional
interpretation independent of what the courts have said or will say.
Courts have only the authority their decisions rationally gain from
their expertise and the like, but the mere fact that the courts have
spoken carries no weight as ordinary people think about what the
Constitution means.3" For ordinary people who are departmentalists
or adhere to the "independent judgment" view, precedent carries
little weight as such, and lawyers who use precedents in public
discussions with such people as they would in their presentations to
courts are not accomplishing much.
Yet, "precedent" can be helpful in public discussions in another
way. For lawyers imbued with a common law sensibility, precedents
matter because they let us think about real-world problems with a
range of characteristics. They allow us to test our interpretations
against our intuitions about problems that might not be immedi-
34. Charles Evans Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce (1907), in
ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, 1906-1916, at 179, 185 (2d ed. 1916).
35. In the Second Amendment discussions, for example, the most a lawyer could fairly say
is that prior to 2008, the Court's most recent discussion of the Amendment came in 1939, in
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), and that the Court's treatment of the Second
Amendment can be read to support both a "militia-related" and an "individual right"
interpretation of the Amendment. See generally Miller, 307 U.S. 174.
36. For advocacy of this approach, see KRAMER, supra note 24, at 247-48.
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ately in front of us.37 Ordinary people tend reasonably enough to
focus on the problem at hand-a specific legislative proposal, for
example-that they assess in policy terms. They then try to make
constitutional sense of the policy position they have taken with
respect to that proposal. Constitutional interpretations, though,
might reach beyond the problem, at least in the view of the policy's
supporters or opponents.3" Good lawyers are adept at generating
examples that they can use to test whether a constitutional
interpretation that makes intuitive sense for the policy at issue
makes equally good sense for some other policies.39 Our comparative
advantage as lawyers, that is, may lie in our ability to look some-
what farther beyond the problems immediately before us than
ordinary people do.4"
II. LAWYERS AS CMic EDUCATORS
Those of us who teach constitutional law regularly face a modest
"crisis" of pedagogy. Why exactly are we teaching our students
constitutional law? It cannot be that we are preparing them for the
practice of law. Few of our students will deal with serious federal
constitutional issues in practice.4 Perhaps every student will run up
against a federal constitutional issue occasionally, and some may
end up practicing in areas in which specific topics-the constitu-
37. For an elaboration (perhaps a bit too fancy for what is basically a discussion of
common law reasoning), see Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions
-A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 595, 620-21 (1999).
38. Lurking within this formulation is a deep question about how strong a lawyer's
commitment to legal realism is. I discuss some aspects of this question below. See infra text
accompanying notes 48-50.
39. Consider, for example, the proposition that the Second Amendment protects an
individual right to keep and bear arms so that an aroused citizenry can fight off the military
forces of an overreaching government. In light of modem conditions, does this mean that
people have a right to keep and bear anti-tank weapons? (Maybe so, actually.)
40. As Ackerman's analysis suggests, this is not a criticism of ordinary people, who have
better things to do than think much beyond the policies immediately at issue in politics. See
ACKERMAN, supra note 24, at 245-48. Lawyers' professional training means that we can look
a bit farther with a smaller investment of time and energy, diverting fewer intellectual
resources to the task than ordinary people might. See id.
41. This is particularly true now that constitutional criminal procedure has been
completely hived off from the basic course in constitutional law. Even if that topic remained
in the syllabus, however, it would be relevant to the legal practice of only a handful of our
graduates.
2009] 1387
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tional limitations on state taxation of interstate commerce, for
example-matter a great deal. But, in the general constitutional law
course we can do almost nothing to prepare these students for their
later specializations. My sense is that the only topic in the basic
constitutional law course that will come up in the practices of a fair
number of our graduates is the preemption of state law by federal
statutes, but a student who happens to be shopping on the Internet
during the few minutes we devote to this topic might miss it
entirely.42
We teach students constitutional law because knowing some-
thing about the Constitution is an important part of a lawyer's pro-
fessional life even though it is not an important part of a lawyer's
professional practice. Among other things, lawyers are important
participants in their communities' civic life, and people expect them
to know something about constitutional law. Even more, people
expect lawyers to be able to tell them something they do not already
know about constitutional law. That is, part of a lawyer's profes-
sional life is the job of civic educator.
Specifying civic education's content is a bit tricky. We might try
to educate people about the content of constitutional law, offering
answers to questions like, "What is the best interpretation of the
Second Amendment?" Although I believe that lawyers should resist
the temptation to answer such questions, I defer offering my
reasons for a few paragraphs so that I can outline what I think is
the better approach.
As civic educators, lawyers should try to get across to ordinary
people that thinking through questions of constitutional interpreta-
tion is a complicated matter. As I have suggested, ordinary people
work out their constitutional views after they have come to some
42. Nor can we say that we are teaching them to "think like lawyers" in any distinctive
way. Indeed, one of the pedagogic challenges in teaching constitutional law is to get students
even to try to deploy the skills of legal thinking that they have learned in their other courses.
That is, the challenge is to get students to think of constitutional law as law at all. They are
inclined to think that constitutional law is a simple reflection of politics, and frankly, as a
general matter, teachers of constitutional law do little to discourage them in so thinking. We
want them to understand that constitutional law is deeply bound up with politics, and at most
we want to ensure that they see that the connections between constitutional law and politics
are deep, interesting, and not always easy to discern, rather than superficial, boring, and
obvious.
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resolution of the questions of public policy in which they are
interested.4 3 As some psychologists might put it, they are motivated
reasoners: given their prior conclusions about good public policy,
they are likely to find constitutional interpretations that support
those conclusions more congenial than interpretations that do
not." Lawyers as civic educators can point out complications that
motivated reasoning might have led ordinary people to overlook, by
posing hypothetical and not-so-hypothetical cases that let their
interlocutors think more deeply about the interpretation they
favor.4"
Consider, for example, a conversation about the individual-rights
interpretation of the Second Amendment.46 As far as I know, every
adherent to that interpretation agrees that the individual's right
to keep and bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation. What,
though, counts as a reasonable regulation? Should it be as difficult
to justify a regulation of the individual's right to keep and bear arms
as it is to justify regulation of the individual's right to speak on
political matters? A lawyer can ask, "Why is it alright to prohibit
people convicted of felonies, who have served their sentences, from
possessing handguns? Do you think that the justification you have
just offered applies to people convicted of nonviolent felonies such
as embezzlement? What about a ban on gun possession by people
under a domestic protection order, who have not been convicted of
anything?" If the job is done well, the lawyer as civic educator will
be able to deepen the ordinary person's understanding of the
individual-rights view by exploring what sorts of justifications are
good enough-and the lawyer can do this all without using lawyers'
jargon about "strict scrutiny," "intermediate scrutiny," and "rational
basis review."47
43. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
44. For an overview of the theory of motivated reasoning, see generally Ziva Kunda, The
Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990).
45. It is important to emphasize that adding complexity need not induce a change in
position, but might help the person better understand exactly what is at stake in adopting
that interpretation.
46. See TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE, supra note 6, at 4.
47. Except perhaps at the conclusion of the conversation, when the lawyer might tell
participants that they may run across that jargon if they start reading the legal literature on
the problem, but that they should not be put off by it, because they have already worked
through the ideas that the jargon simply summarizes.
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Note that my approach avoids some problems that might arise
for those who, like me, are strong legal realists. For strong legal
realists, constitutional interpretations are case- or problem-spe-
cific.48 It is not clear to me that a strong legal realist lawyer could
in good faith use "precedent" or hypothetical cases in the way I
suggest. Perhaps such a lawyer could properly do so in dealing with
people who are not strong legal realists, and who therefore think
that the constitutional interpretation they adopt in the case or
problem at hand has implications for other cases or problems.49 Or,
perhaps more plausibly, the legal realist lawyer could assert that
his or her efforts at civic education are directed at helping ordinary
people think about whether the positions they take on specific
questions of public policy and constitutional interpretation have any
implications for other questions.5 °
As other participants in this Symposium point out, lawyers do
face real constraints on their ability to act as civic educators.51 The
time available for that activity is limited, as is the time available to
learn about the relevant constitutional law on the range of issues
that ordinary people want help in thinking through. Specialization
impairs the lawyer's ability as well. Someone who has a superb
grasp of the constitutional and nonconstitutional law of bank
regulation, and who can explain its details in ways that ordinary
people can understand, might well know almost nothing about the
48. For what is in my view the best presentation of this point, see generally Jan G.
Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 1553 (1974).
49. Even here there is a problem, and I am unsure about its proper resolution. The non-
legal-realist's belief is, to the strong legal realist, mistaken. May the strong legal realist
nonetheless work within the listener's erroneous framework, or must he or she attempt to
educate the listener about legal realist theory? (I am inclined to think the latter.)
50. On this view, the civic education provided by the legal realist lawyer bolsters listeners'
convictions by providing them with the language for resisting arguments that have the form,
'The interpretation you adopt for the case at hand seems to you intuitively correct, but that
very same interpretation applied to a different case leads to conclusions that even you think
are unacceptable; you therefore ought to modify the interpretation you have developed for this
case, and perhaps you will then see that under a more acceptable interpretation, you would
have to abandon your support for the policy."
51. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer-A Brief Informal History of a Myth
with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169 (2009); James E. Moliterno, A
Golden Age of Civic Involvement: The Client Centered Disadvantage for Lawyers Acting as
Public Officials, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1261 (2009).
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Second Amendment. 2 Here lawyers have a professional obligation
to devote some time to learning about current issues of constitu-
tional law; not as deeply as a specialist would, but to an extent
appropriate for their role as civic educators.5 3
Another constraint discussed by other Symposium partici-
pants-duties to clients and the need to avoid taking a public
position that conflicts with a client's interests-may be less im-
portant when the lawyer acts as civic educator than as, for example,
legislative lobbyist.54 We might be concerned about a lawyer's
lobbying efforts because lobbying sometimes occurs behind closed
doors or because lobbying resources might be unbalanced. 5 In
contrast, civic education takes place in the open air.5" Further, as I
have noted, the constitutional issues that concern ordinary people
rarely arise in the lawyer's practice, which suggests that an
imbalance in resources might be rare, or if it occurs, might arise
because the client's position actually already enjoys widespread
support. Finally, client-motivated "civic education" is unlikely to do
more than reinforce views already held.57 Lawyers representing
clients have a distinctive mode of discourse, in which all relevant
considerations point in the same direction-the client's inter-
est-and nuance is lacking. That is precisely where ordinary people
start from, and client-motivated "civic education" is not likely to do
much good--or harm. In any event, disclosure to the public about
52. My sense is that ordinary people understand when a lawyer says that she does not
know anything useful about the law relating to subprime mortgages, to take a recent example,
but are less forgiving if a lawyer says that she does not know anything about the Constitution.
Ordinary people likely understand that the legal topics that come and go are properly the
subjects of true specialists, but do not regard constitutional law as similarly specialized.
53. I have sometimes presented my students with the image of their conversations at a
family Thanksgiving dinner: they should, I suggest, be able to sustain a brief conversation on
pretty much any constitutional issue of current interest. That is the level of knowledge that
I think all lawyers have an obligation to attain.
54. See generally Moliterno, supra note 51.
55. I should note that I personally do not find either of these concerns terribly worrisome,
but I know that others do.
56. Cf. generally Jonathan R. Macey, Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in
the American Law School, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1937 (1993) (discussing the role of civic education
provided to lawyers in law school).
57. This is the so-called "echo chamber effect" in which people hear messages they already
agree with. See KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA, ECHO CHAMBER: RUSH
LIMBAUGH AND THE CONSERVATIVE MEDIA ESTABLISHMENT 75-78 (2008).
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the lawyer's relation to a client with an interest in the subject
should be sufficient to alleviate any concerns.
A different problem might pose more severe difficulties. Lawyers
are citizens as well as professionals. As citizens we have views on
matters of public policy: we are prochoice or prolife, favor or oppose
gun control, and the like. And because we do, we too run the risk of
the same kind of motivated reasoning that ordinary people
use-motivated not by a client's interests but by our own commit-
ments to public policy positions.5" So, when we purport merely to
present the competing arguments to deepen our audience's under-
standing of the constitutional question it is interested in, we will
inevitably shape our presentation in light of our policy commit-
ments. And worse, we will do so subtly, and with respect to the
professional matters as to which we have some comparative
advantage.59 Our listeners may mistakenly think that because we
have no client interests at stake, we are offering a dispassionate
professional view of the matter.
I see two ways of avoiding this difficulty, although neither of
them is completely attractive. First, we could take care to perform
our task as civic educators by performing that task only with respect
to policy issues and constitutional questions as to which we are
largely indifferent.60 Yet, doing so has peculiar implications. By
hypothesis, we are not much interested in the subject and, for
reasons I have already sketched, we will not know much about it. 61
To perform as civic educators, then, we would have to take time to
learn about something in which we have little interest. As dedicated
58. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
59. Of course, if our audience knew about motivated reasoning, listeners could ask what
our views on the policy at issue were and then discount appropriately what we have to say.
I believe this to be unlikely.
60. This suggestion draws on my experience in writing and thinking about the Second
Amendment, a topic in which I had only a passing interest, at most, before writing my book.
The book had its origins in an inquiry from the editor of a proposed series on "inalienable
rights" who asked whether I would be interested in writing a book in the series, and if so, on
which rights. I replied that I would be happy to do something on the First Amendment's
religion clauses, but that to accommodate him I would consider writing on some other topic.
He responded that he had already lined someone up for the religion clauses, but needed
someone to write on the Second Amendment. I agreed to do so, again mostly out of friendship
and some minor interest in the subject.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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professionals, some of us might actually do that, but I would not
think it likely that many of us will.
The other possibility might seem even more paradoxical. We could
take an interest in various matters of public policy and constitu-
tional interpretation, but assiduously work to avoid having any
substantive views about them.62 Then, when we work as civic
educators, we will genuinely not have any basis for motivated
reasoning. The seeming paradox, though, is that our ability to
perform our duty as civic educators requires that we disengage
ourselves from the very policy and interpretive controversies that
constitute our civic life. Or, more forcefully, to be good civic edu-
cators perhaps we must be bad citizens.
Perhaps not, though. After all, lawyers in an adversary system
are familiar with the stance I have described. It is the stance they
are allowed to take with respect to their clients' positions. 3 A
lawyer may represent a client when accomplishing the client's goals
in something the lawyer as a citizen opposes. 4 Perhaps the lawyer
as civic educator should take a similar stance with respect to public
policy, treating it as a matter of indifference.
Here too the problem of incentives arises. Lawyers represent
clients when they disagree with the clients' positions basically
because they are paid to do so. Money provides the incentive to be
indifferent about the client's goals.65 Nothing but a sense of
professional duty can do so with respect to civic education. I am
62. Perhaps it is an advantage of the strong legal realist position mentioned above, see
supra text accompanying notes 48-50, that legal realists know that, although they have
arguments to which they are committed, those arguments are no better, as legal arguments,
than those of adherents to positions they oppose.
63. "Allowed," not "required," because as a general matter lawyers have no professional
obligation to represent clients with whose positions they disagree (with some important
exceptions, such as the famous "last lawyer in town" problem of providing representation to
a despised client who is unable to obtain other representation). See MODEL RULES OF PROFL
CONDUCT R. 1.16(b) (2008).
64. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that a lawyer should represent a client
even if the lawyer opposes the client's cause. Id. at R. 1.3 cmt.; see also Robert P. George,
Reflections on the Ethics of Representing Clients Whose Aims Are Unjust, 40 S. TEX. L. REV.
55, 55-56 (1999) (stating that it is possible to represent clients whose objectives are unjust).
65. For an important exchange on the implications of this observation, see Charles Fried,
The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060, 1074-76 (1976), and Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Allen Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer
as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 578-79, 582 (1976).
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afraid that relative to all the other constraints and incentives a
lawyer faces, that might not be enough.
CONCLUSION
I became increasingly discouraged as I worked out the thoughts
I have expressed here. I began with a reasonably firm conviction,
based on my reflections on teaching constitutional law, that lawyers
had an important role to play as civic educators. I also thought that
that role was rarely described in an analytic way, beyond the
cheerleading of Law Day speeches. I may have found out why that
is so. Lawyers may have a professional duty to act as civic educa-
tors, but I fear that we are unlikely to perform that duty well.66
66. Although perhaps no worse than we perform our other professional duties, I suppose.
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